

SUMMARIES

I. *Diószegi*: How Andrassy's political career started and stopped short in the years 1871—75

The introductory passages of the paper show us the Austro-German, Hungarian and Slav efforts in foreign policy in the period after the French-Prussian war, deal with the Hohenzollern-attempt, and introduce the circumstances of Andrassy's nomination for the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Speaking of the start of his career the author analyses in detail the minutes of the military-political meeting of February 1872, interpreting it as the overture of the issuing anti-Russian trend in foreign policy.

In the following the author analyses the political consequences of this turn and the steps towards an anti-Russian alliance. He calls attention to those circumstances which prevented the success of such an alliance policy and forced Andrassy to accept the idea of the alliance of the three emperors instead of the anti-Russian one.

The second part of the paper is devoted to the Austro-Russian, Austro-Turkish, Austro-Balkan, and Austro-Italian relations of 1873—1875. It comes to the conclusion that the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy regarding the Balkans in these years was guided by the principles of the "three emperors policy" in most part. The author deals with the formation and changes of the Austro-German relations in detail, and points out that Andrassy managed to preserve his detachment in many cases, and even turned against the German efforts at times. The Austro-Hungarian foreign policy wanting to create balance was exceedingly conspicuous in the period of the 1875 crisis "Krieg in Sicht?". The paper concludes that Andrassy, though he had adopted the "three emperors policy" unwillingly at first, thought it to be the only possible one in the summer of 1875, and did not want to alter the monarchy's policy of alliance for the time being.

Z. *Szász*: The Rumanian schools in Brashov: a problem of the nationalities-policy at the end of the last century

During the period following the 1867 Compromise the Hungarian governments consciously strove to restrict the non-Hungarian people's national aspirations and political organizations. The liberal atmosphere and laws of the period, however, allowed neither for systematic "magyarization", nor for depriving the nationalities of their own cultural institutions, and of properties needed for their maintenance.

The Rumanian secondary school founded in 1850 in Brashov, one of the few in Transylvania, had a role of prime importance in the education of a nationally self-conscious intelligentsia. From 1861 on, the Rumanian government regularly supported the school, several times raising the amount of the donation. During the years following the Compromise, both the Bucharest and the Budapest governments sent aid to the Rumanian schools in Brashov maintained by the Greek Orthodox Church. The liberal Hungarian governments thought it only natural that Bucharest should subsidize Rumanian culture even across national boundaries, and frequently insisted on being the one to pass on to Brashov the subsidy sent by Bucharest. The Hungarian government thereby recognized the right of the Rumanian state to support Rumanian education in Hungary. When, however, the relationship between the government and the nationalities took a turn for the worse, Hungarian statesmen became less open-minded: the acceptance of foreign aid was forbidden in 1875. Nevertheless, for the next 20 years the Rumanian secondary school in Brashov continued to receive Bucharest's more or less clandestine support.

The study deals primarily with the related activities of the Bánffy government (1895—1899). Bánffy was the one who founded a "nationalities department" to coordinate and direct

the counties' own aggressive measures against the nationalities. Part of this new nationalities-policy was to obstruct all political and cultural subsidies coming from Rumania. Bánffy did, in fact, succeed in having the Foreign Ministry persuade the Sturdza government in Bucharest to cease sending all cultural aid. In the case of the Brashov schools, however, the Bánffy government had to give in. The Rumanian Church which ran the school used its centuries of contacts in Muntenia and Moldavia to have the theretofore secretly sent aid legalized under civic law. For both domestic and foreign policy reasons, Bánffy had to let it go at that. It was important that Sturdza stay in power for the treaty tying Rumania to the Triple Alliance to remain in effect; furthermore, Sturdza was supporting the faction of Transylvanian Rumanian nationalists that the Hungarian government then considered the less dangerous. The study also outlines the steps Bánffy took to try to get the Brashov school to accept aid from the Hungarian government in order that he should then be able to claim say in the school's affairs. For Bánffy attached significance to the Bucharest aid primarily because he hoped that without it, the school would be compelled to accept the Hungarian government's aid — and submit to its supervision. The entire issue was part of his campaign to intensify the "magyarization" of the schools. But, when the Rumanian opposition tried to use the Brashov school issue against Sturdza, Bánffy accepted the compromise solution already mentioned: the Bucharest government transferred 962,500 forints of Rumanian bonds to Budapest; the Hungarian Ministry of Education then yearly sent its 4% interest, 38,500 forints to the Brashov secondary school.

The principle of the agreement had been worked out by the Sturdza government and the Foreign Ministry of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Bánffy was the one to accept the principle — but it was left to the two successor governments — that of Kálmán Széll and G. Gr. Contacuzino — to put it into practice.

With the help of the Rumanian government and its opposition the Rumanian secondary school in Brashov had defended its independence in the name of church autonomy. Its task was facilitated by the fact that Hungarian nationalism and the Monarchy's foreign policy objectives clashed on the Rumanian issue; and the conflicts within the Hungarian ruling class itself always gave the nationalities a certain freedom of movement in the defence of their national and cultural interests. The case of the Brashov school, discussed in this study, well illustrates this.

The author relies on sources from the diplomatic archives in his outline of the motives and preliminaries of the agreement.

L. Solymosi: Research and exploitation of the more important medieval sources of local history

The great number of publications in local history in the last one decade and a half or so indicates that, in concordance with the principle of socialist patriotism, an ever growing interest is present in our society towards local history, and that ever broader masses are interested not only in the history of the country, but also in that of their own homeland — a town or village. However welcome this newly developed social interest may be, we must admit that the level of works on local history depends much more on the qualification of their authors than on the demands and support of society. The present level of these works demands an improvement in the knowledge and professional skill of our local historians. The author of the present article wants to help this process by offering guiding principles of methodology in connexion of the research and use of medieval sources in local history.

Similarly to the social demands, the author thinks that the most important task of medieval local history is the research of the history of localities of the Middle Ages existing today. This practically means that the historian must deal with all medieval settlements — demolished or still existing — on the confines of the town or village he has chosen for examination. As the majority of the settlements in medieval Hungary were villages (*villa*) and village towns (*oppidum*), medieval local history should concentrate primarily on these.

This guide in methodology deals mainly with two outstanding groups of sources: the written ones and the proper names. The local historian makes use mostly of ten more important types of medieval written sources. These are the following: charters, urbaria, tax rolls, deeds of gift (*litterae donationales*), charters of class (*litterae divisionales*), charters of field (*litterae metales*), letters of judgement (*litterae adiudicatoriae*), private letters (*litterae missiles*), inventories (*inventaria*), and wills (*testamenta*). The author gives a detailed picture of all these types, dissimilar in character, of their source value and application in history.

Owing to the scarcity of medieval sources, proper names and place names found in the written ones provide a most important source. Proper names allow us to draw conclusions as

to the occupation, home and ethnic group of the persons in question. The changes in the neme material reflect the continuity or discontinuity among the inhabitants of a settlement, while the genealogical study of the personal names reveals the network of kinship and the background of the family careers.

Place names provide data primarily on the inhabitants, owners or proprietors of a settlement, its economic role, significant buildings and institutions, its division into several parts and its decay. The author introduces to us the most important types of place names and the date of their coming to existence. The typology of place names, by giving the time limits of certain types, helps a lot in the research of the early history of the settlements and in fixing the date of their birth. The author also deals with the problems of name-identification and localization, the obstacles in the employment of place names in history, the solution of which he hopes to be brought by a cooperation of archaeology, history and linguistics.

According to the opinion expounded in the methodological guide, the study of the archival material — which normally follows the one of the already existing literature on the subject and that of the source publications — should be extended. The minimum of archival research is to study the archives of the medieval owners and that of the settlement itself, if such an institution existed at all. The manysided research of the past demands, however, much more than this.

Many of the medieval Hungarian written sources have come about through the activity of the chapters and convents at the *loci credibili*, and that of the county authorities. Their documents were preserved in several different archives. As the activity of a *loca credibilia* or a county authority was restricted to a certain district or territory, the location and sources of settlement found earlier helps us to find out, which *locus credibilis* and county authority it was subject to. The historian can then make notes of the publications or documents of this *locus credibilis* and county authority with the help of the archival studyaids, the thorough study of which promotes the research not only of the given settlement, but also that of the medieval history of the whole territory. The knowledge of the sources throwing light on nearly all aspects of medieval life makes a manysided introduction of the settlements past possible, helps in fighting down narrow-minded provincialism, ensures the elaboration of new themes, while the publication of the documents of the competent *loci credibili* and county authorities in a repertory-like form makes the work not only of the medievalists but also of the students of other periods easier.

J. Varga J.: The estates of servientes doing military service on the Batthyány latifundium in the 16—17th centuries

Many nobles running away from the Turks and also those living permanently in the region entered the service of landlords in Transdanubia in the 16—17th centuries. The demands of the age as to the defence of the country and of their own security culminated in one point: in the necessity of entering into military service as *servientes* of landlords or wealthy medium landowners and defending the western part of the country.

The noblemen soldiering on the Batthyány estate usually got a demesne or an allotment for their service beside their pay. When granting a hereditary property, the lord remembered the faithful service of his servants and as a reward granted to them and to their heirs an irrevocable right to the property. At the same time he secured his followers quiet enjoyment and put them in possession. Many *servientes* were rewarded like that, consequently part of the landlord's property fell into strange hands. In order to stop this process, the landlord did not refrain from violence beside his influences exerted on the *servientes* and the application of lawful means. Thus in the struggle between the big landlords and the smaller landowners it was the former who got the upper hand. These grants of property formed only part of the property of the *servientes*. The other part consisted of the ancestral landed property bought or rented as continuing inheritance and the land occupied in the course of the formation of the manors. The reward of the *servientes* described above was the closest to the pledges gaining special significance in the 17th century. The *serviens* could be either creditor or debtor and had equal rights with his landlord and any body else in any case except for acting as judge in legal matters. Although putting something in pledge usually served for making money, the landlords made the hereditary pledges suitable for tying generations of *servientes* to the large estate, ensuring by this the condition of their land on the one hand, and a permanent layer of military leaders for their private armies on the other.

Examining the pledge cases we found that there were great differences among the nobles in military service, and that their relations to the landlords' families were handed down to their sons.

The *serviens*-layer participated in the formation or foundation of the manors with means similar to those of the barons. Their farms — though smaller and with more modest possibilities — benefited from the marketing conditions of the western part of the country, as can be seen in the Sopron country manor of Ferenc Káldy II, leader of the personal guard and yeomanry in the service of Kristóf Batthyány II.

The *serviens* estate in the 16—17th centuries — and the whole institution of this kind of service — was a product of the period of the Turkish occupation, was created by the demands of home-defence. By playing a great part in driving the Turks out of the country it fulfilled its role in history and cannot be observed in the 18th century any more

Eddie M. Scott: Cui bono? Hungary and protectionism in the dual Monarchy

The controversial historical debate concerning the benefits and costs of membership in the Austro-Hungarian customs union has recently been enriched by a contribution by Péter Hanák, who — using price indexes constructed by the Central Statistical Bureau—shows that relative price movements favoured Hungary more than Austria throughout the era of the Dual Monarchy. This paper shows however, that the price indexes are seriously deficient, and the conclusion is therefore very questionable. An alternative methodology is presented, which allows all categories of exports and imports to be included in the analysis and which can, with the aid of a computer, estimate the *magnitude* of benefits or costs to Hungarian exporters. The main conclusions are as follows: Throughout the period for which reliable foreign trade data are available (1882—1913), the terms of trade were consistently biased against Hungarian exporters, amounting to a “tax” of at least some 2—8% of the value of their total exports. Agricultural exporters were considerably more disadvantaged than exporters in general, but the burdens were not equally shared: In fact, after the mid-1890s, grain exporters were actually *subsidised*, rather than taxed, by the trade and tariff policies of the Dual Monarchy. From this and other evidence, it seems clear that large-estate owners benefited while small farmers were heavily burdened by these policies. The parallel to the German case is quite striking.